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back and directed its movements until reaching ali auto-court
where, after the renting of two cabins: the defendant and
the driver had sexual intercourse with woman occupants of
the cab, and where there was no reference in the testimony
of the police officers to questions addressed by them to the
defendant with respect to the purported charges of kidnaping
or robbery.
.

[1] Criminal Law.....,-Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact-Where

Testimony is Inherently Improbable-What Constitutes Inherent Improbability.-A question of law authorizing theappellate court. to set aside a conviction is presented where the
evidence is inherently improbable. In such circumstances, the
court will presume the verdict was the result of passion and
prejudice. To be improbable on its face the evidence must
assert that something has occurred that it does not seem
possible could have occurred under the circumstances disclosed. The improbability must be apparent; evidence which
is unusual or inconsistent is not necessarily improbable.
[2] Rape-Appeal-Review of Particular Findings-Matters Affecting Consent.-A conviction of rape was set aside on the
ground of inherent improbability of the testimony where, notwithstanding testimony that the victim entered a cabin and
submitted to sexual intercourse upon defendant's order while
he was armed, there were circumstances negativing her nonconsent, and where, moreover, the jury had acquitted defendant of a prior act charged despite the witness' testimony relating thereto was as positive as that relating to the act of
which the defendant was convicted.
[3] Robbery _ Review - Review of Evidence.-A conviction of
robbery was set aside on appeal where it was based on testimony as to the payment of part of the cabin rental by the
operator of a taxicab pursuant to order' of the defendant
while armed, where there was also testimony that the witness
left the office to ascertain the license number of the car and
returned, and where there was no reference in the testimony
of police officers to questions addressed by them to the defendant with respect to the asserted charges of kidnaping for
the purpose of robbery, or robbery.
[4] Kidnaping-Evidence-Kidnapin g for Purpose of Robbery.A conviction of kidnaping for the purpose of robbery was set
aside on .the grou:nd of inherent improbability of the testimony where it was based on testimony tending to show that
the defendant, while in a taxicab, placed a gun at the driver's

1. See 8 Cal. Jur. 590.
Melt. Dig. References: 1. Criminal Law, §§ 1322, 1322 (1); 2Rape, § 94 (5); 3. Robbery, § 44; 4. Kidnaping, § 7.

APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County and from order denying new trial. Arthur
Crum, Judge. ' Reversed.
Mark F. Jones and W. L. Engelhardt for Appellant.
Earl Warren, Attorney-General, and R. S. McLaughlin,
Deputy Attorney-General, for Respondent.
THE COURT.-In an information filed by the District
Attorney of Los Angeles County, the defendant was charged
with the commission of five distinct offenses. A jury trial
resulted in his conviction and sentence on the three counts
of kidnaping for purpose of robbery, robbery, and rape, the
sentences thereon to run concurrently. The defendant wag
acquitted on two other counts charging another rape and
grand theft. Upon this appeal he challenges the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the three verdicts of conviction
and the judgments based thereon.
[1] It is not the function of appellate courts to weigh evidence. (People v. Tom Woo, 181 Cal. 315 [184 Pac. 389] 0;
Peoplev. Tedesco, 1 Cal. (2d) 211 [34 Pac. (2d) 467] ; People v. Perkins, 8 Cal. (2d) 502 [66 Pac. (2d) 631].) Where,
however, the evidence relied upon by the prosecution is so
improbable as' to be incredible, and amounts to no evidence, a question of law is presented which authorizes an
appellate court to set aside a conviction. (People v. Dorland,
2 Cal. (2d) 235 [40 Pac. (2d) 474] .) Under such circumstances an appellate court will assume that the verdict was
the result of passion and prejudice. (People v. Niino, 183
Cal. 126 [190 Pac. 626].) To be improbable on its face the
evidence must assert that something has occurred that it does
not seem possible could have occurred under the circumstances
disclosed. The improbability must be apparent; evidence
which is unusual or inconsistent is not necessarily improbable;
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(People v. Braun, 14 Cal. (2d) 1 [92 Pac. (2d) 402] ; People
v. Moreno, 26 Cal. App. (2d) 334 [79 Pac. (2d) 390].) In
this case the inherent improbability of the testimony of the
principal witnesses is readily apparent from an examination
of the record. The five charges contained in the information
arose out· of a sequence of alleged acts purportedly occurring
within a few hours. In considering the evidence it is relevant
to consider the evidence addressed to the two charges of
which the defendant stands acquitted, for it contributes to
the improbability of the evidence addressed to the three
charges of which the defendant stands convicted.
[2-4] Miss Helen Cash, 22 years of age, testified as follows:
On the evening of April 14, 1940, she left a moving picture
theatre in Compton with her friend Mrs. Goodwin at approximately 10 :50 p. m., and hailed a taxicab. She had met
the driver, John Fontana, on a previous occasion, and she
and Mrs. Goodwin sat in the front seat with Fontana.
Shortly after they entered the cab Fontana made a stop and
received a call to go to the McDonald party house, a highway
tavern. They arrived there at about 11 :00 p. m. Fontana
went to the tavern and came back to the cab with the defendant who said he wanted to go to Southgate. The defendant
sat in the back seat and during the ride "pulled guns" on
them. At the time she saw only one gun which the defendant held in his right hand "on Mr. Fontana's neck" while
telling him to keep going and threatening them if they attempted to attract attention. Later, the defendant asked
Fontana" what girl belonged to him," and when Mrs. Goodwin replied "I do" the defendant put the gun on the shoulder
of the witness and told her to get in the back seat with him.
She looked at Fontana who suggested compliance, whereupon
she climbed into' the back seat with the defendant. The defendant then placed his right arm around her with the gun
against her right temple, began to fondle her person and
then, as she related, "he laid me down on the seat and attacked me." Nothing was said by anyone, and during the
act of intercourse she did not see the gun. Subsequently, the
defendant told Fontana to drive into an auto-court, which in
time he did. Thereupon the defendant put the gun in Fontana's ribs, told him to get out of the cab and directed the
witness to get back into the front seat with Mrs. Goodwin
while he and Fontana proceeded to the office of the auto-court.
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At this point, in answering a question of the district attorney, the witness volunteered the information that, when
leaving with the defendant for the auto-court office, "Mr.
Fontana left the car running so if we wanted to we could
drive it off." Immediately the district attorney said, "I ask
tha t be stricken out," to which the trial court replied " Yes. "
How much of the answer, of which the foregoing was only a
part, was requested by the district attorney to be stricken is
uncertain.
The witness then went on to testify: .As the two men went
into the office of the auto-court she did not see the defendant
do anything to conceal the gun he held on Fontana's ribs.
The two men returned shortly, the defendant getting into
the back seat. Fontana drove the cab to cabins numbered 11
and 12 and put the cab in the shelter provided therefor. The
witness did not see the gun during these proceedings. The
defendant asked for the key to the cab, which Fontana gave
him. He then displayed two guns and threatened them if
they "tried to do anything." Mrs. Goodwin and Fontana
went into cabin 12 and the witness and the defendant into
cabin 11. She closed the door behind her, .and it was not
thereafter locked. She inquired "where do you turn the
light on here," whereupon the defendant lighted the cabin.
The defendant placed one gun on the dresser and pointed the
other at her and told her to undress. She undressed and
got into bed. The defendant undressed, placed a pistol under
the pillow and got into bed. In response to a query as to
what then happened, the witness replied, "Well, we had
sexual intercourse again." She did not remember the defendant saying anything immediately preceding and during
this time. The defendant then told her to do a revolting act,
which she did, assertedly in fear of bodily harm from the gun.
She submitted each time, however, without any plea, remonstrance or struggle. Shortly after, when officers knocked at
the door she went to the bathroom, dressed, and then told
the officers what the defendant had done.
·On cross-examination the witness again related substantially
the same story with the addition of the following: The defendant and Fontana were in the office of the auto-court for
about five minutes. During that time she did not always
watch the defendant but talked to Mrs. Goodwin. The latter
. suggested getting out and running, but the witness rejected
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the idea because the defendant would shoot them or Fontana.
During the episode in the cab Mrs. Goodwin looked around
to the back seat but none of the three protested the defendant's conduct. The witness was assertedly in fear because
.of the gun and defendant's earlier threats. Just before entering the cabin the defendant requested Fontana to awaken
him in the morning and said, "I will buy breakfast because
I have five fifty-dollar bills in my pocket." Before entering
the cabin she did not plead or remonstrate with the defendant. When the defendant told her to undress she did not
protest; instead, she "never said a thing."
Mike Gasparich, a garage owner, testified that the defendant had worked for him. He identified the two guns possessed
by the defendant as having been found in the glove compartment of a wrecked car which had been towed into his garage.
The guns and other things, he testified, had been removed
with the defendant's assistance from the car and placed in
a box in the garage office.
Robert Thomas, a bartender at the McDonald party house,
testified that' the defendant appeared there about 9 :30 p. m.,
and ordered a drink; that he was showing off two pistols; that
the witness asked for them and "put them behind the bar";
and that he returned them to the defendant before he left
at about 11 :00 p. m. in a cab which had been called at his
request.
John Fontana, the cab driver, related a series of events
substantially similar to Miss Cash's testimony. He testified
as follows: As he drove along with the two women in the
front seat the defendant in the back seat said "get going,"
and he felt "cold steel" against his neck. He did not see
what later occurred in the back seat between the defendant
and Miss Cash, but in the rear-view mirror he could see the
defendant who kept his face toward him most of the time.
When he entered the office of the auto-court he left the motor
running, the lights on, and the key in the car. . The defendant
kept the gun against his ribs at all times, and there was light
enough at one time for it to be seen by the proprietor. The
defendant started paying the proprietor for the two cabins
rented and then said to the· witness, "You pay the balance
whatever it is." He paid the balance ($1.50) at the defendant's command. (This transaction constitutes the basis
of the robbery conviction.) After the witness had signed the
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register the proprietor asked for the license number of the
car, and he went to the door of the office to look at the license
with the defendant at his back at all times. He and Mrs.
Goodwin entered cabin 12 pursuant to the defendant's directions and he later got out through the bathroom window and
summoned police officers.
On cross-examination the witness testified that when he and
Mrs. Goodwin entered. cabin 12 the defendant told them to
lock themselves in, but that the defendant did not ask for
the key. He stated that at the time of trial he was out of
the taxicab business, the adverse publicity resulting therefrom
causing women to refuse to ride with him.
Mrs. Goodwin told substantially the same story as Miss
Cash and Fontana. It is relevant here only to note that she
testified that she saw the defendant on top of Miss Cash in
the back seat of the car with a gun at her head, and that she
(the witness) thereupon "jabbed" Fontana in the ribs and
he looked at her and smiled.
J ames Roberts, proprietor of the auto-court where the
quartet' stopped, testified as follows. The defendant and
Fontana came to his office about 12 :15 a. m., alid said they
wanted two cabins. He told them they would have to register their "wives" and the license number of their car.
Fontana "went out far enough so he could see it" and "then
he came back and put the license down." Upon inquiry
Fontana was informed that the charge for the cabins would
be $4.00, whereupon the defendant, after searching his
pockets, found some small change which he placed on the
counter with the request that it be counted. It added up to
$2.50, whereupon the defendant asked Fontana if he had any
money. Fontana then turned over $1.50 which made up
the difference. On cross-examination the witness testified
that when Fontana left the office to get the car license number "he 'Yent out past this l\lr. Headlee [defendant] and went
out on the step and looked down . . . and came back and
put it down." During all of this time the defendant was
doing nothing other than leaning against the office desk. The
car was so parked that the witness "could not see it from
the office."
The defendant, who is 25 years of age, took the stand in
his own defense and testified as follows: He and the proprietor of the garage where he worked found two guns in a'
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wrecked car which had been brought into the garage. On
the afternoon of April 14, 1940, he took the guns with him
to deliver them to the sheriff's office at Firestone Station and
on the way stopped at a tavern. He later proceeded with a
friend in the latter's car to the ~fcDonald party house which
his friend subsequently left. The witness then took the
guns from the car and openly carried them into the McDonald
party house where he showed them to a person sitting at
the bar. The bartender placed them under the bar to 0 bvia te
any fear among other patrons. The witness later had a cab
called and took back the guns as he left. As he walked to
the cab with Fontana the latter said, "I have a couple of
hotshot girls out here, do you mind if they go along . . .
they are hustlers." The defendant said it was all right with
him. As he walked to the cab he had one gun in his pocket
and the other in its holster in his hand, and as he entered
the cab he placed the latter weapon on the seat beside hini.
As they were riding he asked Fontana which girl was with
him, to which Mrs. Goodwin replied, "I am." He then
asked Miss Cash if she would join him in the back seat, which
she did by climbing over the front seat. He" loved her up
a little" and she offered no objection. After a while Miss
Cash asked him if he wanted to go to a cabin. He assented.
Fontana said he knew of an auto-court and drove there. The
witness and Fontana entered the office and the latter signed
the register. When informed that the cabins would cost
$4.00 the defendant went through his pockets and brought
out $2.50 which he placed on the counter and then asked
Fontana if he had any money. Fontana replied affirmatively and brought out $1.50, which he pushed over the desk
to the proprietor. The quartet then proceeded to the cabins.
While opening the cabin doors he asked Fontana not to run
off and leave him out" there. Fontana promised not to and
gave the defendant the key to the car. The witness and Miss
Cash entered one of the cabins and he placed one gun in a
dresser drawer and, as was his custom at his garage headquarters, placed one gun under a pillow. Miss Cash said
she would have to have her money first. Upon objection that
she asked too much money she replied, "Well, Johnny [Fontana] will have to have his part of it." They undressed and
engaged in an act of intercourse and other conduct with the
consent and solicitation of Miss Cash. When the officers
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knocked he told them to come in, that the door was open. He
denied having intercourse with Miss Cash in the cab and
also denied ever threatening any of the three or making them
do anything against their will.
From the foregoing testimony of the principal prosecution
witnesses, the conclusion that those witnesses did not consent,
either actively or passively, to the occurrences of that evening
is incredible. None of them offered any objection when the
defendant allegedly engaged in an act of sexual intercourse
with Miss Cash in the cab against her wilL Nor did they
in any manner attempt to prevent the defendant from carryingout his act. On the contrary, Mrs. Goodwin testified that
when she "jabbed" Fontana in the ribs during this episode
he looked at her and smiled. These are not the normal actions of persons outraged by conduct such as that charged
to the defendant. They claim to have been in fear of the defendant's guns, yet Miss Cash testified that the defendant
kept the gun against her head and person during the act of
intercourse, while according to Fontana's story the gun was
pressed against his neck at all times.
It is significant that Fontana and the defendant left the
. cab for five minutes or more to make arrangements for cabins
at the auto-court office. Both Miss Cash and Fontana· testified that the motor of the car was running all during this
period. The proprietor of the auto-court testified that he
could not see the cab from the office. Miss Cash admitted
that she was not watching the men at all times when they
were in the office, but, instead, was talking with Mrs. Goodwin. No effort was made by either woman to drive the car
away or to leave the car and attempt an escape by foot
under (!over of darkness, though admittedly Mrs. Goodwin
had suggested the latter course. This is not the conduct of
a person who has been kidnaped or assertedly the victim of a
previous attack.
The conduct of Fontana while in the office of the autocourt was not that of a person who was being kidnaped and
robbed. According to his own testimony he went beyond
the·door of the office to ascertain the license number of his
car. The proprietor of the auto-court testified that Fontana
went out on the step of the office past the defendant, who at
the time was merely leaning on the desk. According to his
testimony, the two men were some distance apart at that
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point and he observed no gun being held by the defendant.
The money transaction in the office discloses only a financial
inability on the defendant's part to defray the entire cost of
the cabin rentals, and a request that Fontana contribute
thereto.
The improbability of the ,prosecution testimony that defendant demanded the key to the car to prevent the escape of
his asserted victims, and the reasonableness of defendant's
explanation that the key was voluntarily delivered to him
as a gesture of good faith in response to his request that the
parties not 'leave him at the auto-court, are attested by the
fact that defendant concededly permitted Fontana and Mrs.
Goodwin to enter a separate cabin, they retaining the key
therefor, thus freeing themselves from the asserted coercion.
The conduct of Miss Cash in the cabin does not reveal any
opposition on her part to the proceedings. She made no objection to entering the cabin with the defendant. Upon entering the cabin she closed the door behind her and inquired
where the light could be turned on. This action indicates
that the defendant must have preceded her into the' cabin
and thus did not force her to enter. The asserted attack in
the cabin admittedly took place without any plea or word of
protest or objection from her. Concededly, she exerted no
physical effort to prevent the alleged assault. Certain pal~ts
of her testimony indicate that, although unmarried, she had
previously engaged in acts of sexual intercourse. In the light
of all that had gone before, with the opportunities of escape
above mentioned, we think it highly improbable that the total
absence of objection and resistance was prompted by the defendant's asserted earlier threats.
The jury acquitted the defendant of the charge of rape in
the taxicab, yet Miss Cash testified unequivocally to the occurrence of an act of sexual intercourse between her and
the defendant at that time. The jury therefore.-either entirely disbelieved the prosecution testimony and concluded
that the act,did not occur, or it concluded that th~ract was
performed with the' consent of Miss Cash. If the jury entirely disbelieved the witnesses as to the occurrence of the
first act of intercourse, it could not reasonably believe the
testimony as to the second act of intercourse, and its verdict
to the contrary must have been the result of passion and
prejudice. The first act was aRSertedly committed in the
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presence of all three witnesses; the second act supposedly occurred when the defendant and Miss Cash were alone in the
cabin and Miss Cash was the only prosecution witness to
testify to its occurrence. Her testimony as to the occurrence
of the first act was just as positive as her testimony as to
the occurrence of the,second. If the jury concluded that the
first act of intercourse actually took place but that it occurred
with the consent of Miss Cash, it is highly improbable that
she did not consent to the second act, particularly in view of
the fact that she offered no objection or resistance to it.
The asserted silence or admissions of the defendant in response to questions by the officers as to his having had intercourse with Miss Cash do not require a different conclusion.
Read in its entirety the evidence merely shows an admission
by the defendant of sexual intercourse with Miss Cash, with
her consent. The testimony of the deputy sheriff Welever
as to the girl's charge made in the cabin and the defendant's
response thereto, when read in connection with' the girl's
testimony at ,the trial describing the circumstances surrounding commission of the alleged attacks, definitely indicates that
she was referring to the asserted rape in the cab, of which the
defendant stands acquitted. It is significant that there is
no reference in the testimony of the officers to questions addressed. by them to the defendant with respect to the asserted
charges of kidnaping for the purpose of robbery, or robbery.
The judgments and order denying a new trial are, and each
is, hereby reversed.

[Sac. No. 5325. In Bank.-July 23, 1941.J

THE UNION LEAGUE CLUB (a Corporation), Respondent, v. CHARLES' G. JOHNSON,as State Treasurer,
etc., Appellant.
[la,lbl Taxation-Miscellaneous Taxes-Sales Tax-Social Club
Serving Liquor.-Under the Retail Sales Tax Act, as it stood
in 1935 (Stats. 1933, p. 2599; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937,
Act 8493),a bona fide social club with limited and select mem1. See 10 Cal. Jur. Ten;..year Supp. 568.
McK. Dig. References: 1. Taxation, § 459; 2. Statutes, § 184.
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